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ABSTRACT
Firm Ownership, Institutional Environment,
and Audit Collusion:
Empirical Evidence from A Transitional Economy

By

WANG Rui

Master of Philosophy

Motivated by the renewed interest in, but insufficient empirical evidence of,
collusion between auditors and corporate management, I examine this issue in the
unique environment of China, which is characterized by a high level of government
control over listed companies and auditors, strong competition for audit clients, and
uneven economic and legal development across the country. In contrast to prior studies,
I employ a two-stage regression approach to study the determinants of audit collusion
in China. In the first stage, I develop an audit opinion prediction model of Big 4
auditors (viewed as “typical” auditors) that corrects for self-selection bias. I then apply
this opinion prediction model to clients of non-Big 4 (local) auditors. I define audit
collusion as the discrepancy between the actual opinions that clients of local auditors
received and the opinions these clients would have received under similar
circumstances had they hired typical auditors (i.e., Big 4 auditors): that is, the
predicted opinions. In the second stage, I regress an audit collusion proxy on client and
auditor characteristics and institutional variables to detect the determinants of audit
collusion in China.
Audit collusion depends on the closeness of the relation among three parties – the
company owner, the company manager, and the auditor. Prior studies suggest that
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local auditors have the closest relationship and
that their interests are mostly aligned. As audit qualification and client loss are costly
for SOE managers and local auditors, respectively, both parties have strong incentives
to abide by a self-enforcing collusive agreement. Therefore, I expect audit collusion to
occur in SOEs that demonstrate poor firm performance (which could lead to qualified
opinions), in listed companies that are characterized by a strong government presence
and the audit reports of which are subject to government interference, and when
market forces are not strong enough to deter collusive behavior.
Using a sample of 4,874 firm-year observations over the 2001-2006 period, I find
statistically robust evidence to confirm my hypotheses. Specifically, I find that SOEs
in poor financial condition and for which the government is the largest shareholder

tend to collude with their auditors. In addition, I find that the relation between
non-SOEs (regardless of their financial condition) and audit collusion to be
significantly negative, which suggests that the interests of non-SOEs are mostly
aligned with the interests of individual investors. Consistent with prior studies, I also
find that audit collusion usually occurs in regions in which the underlying institutional
features of the market environment are not in place to punish auditors.
Prior research generally uses auditor switching to test for the existence of
collusive auditor behavior by comparing observed pre- and post-switch audit opinions.
As a result, relatively little attention has been paid to the possibility of audit collusion
in the absence of auditor switching. Moreover, comparison of observed opinions
before and after companies switch auditors is subject to potential self-selection bias, as
post-switchers are not randomly assigned to audit firms. The present study overcomes
these problems by considering all listed companies (regardless of auditor switching)
and using the two-stage Heckman approach to control for self-selection bias. Further,
in contrast to most prior research, which uses an analytical model to distinguish honest
and dishonest auditor reporting, I empirically test collusion by comparing the
difference between the actual opinions that client firms receive and the opinions they
would have received had they used independent, higher quality auditors.
My results suggest that as long as the interests of the company and the auditor
coincide and neither party has an incentive to break the collusive agreement, audit
collusion can occur even when auditor switching does not take place. The finding that
audit collusion exists in China suggests that government rules and regulations alone
are not sufficient to create a healthy audit market. Rather, the government should
improve the overall institutional environment through measures such as the reduction
of government ownership of firms, withdrawal of the government from involvement in
both the stock and audit markets, and development of a credit market and legal
environment that deter collusive auditor behavior.
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Firm Ownership, Institutional Environment, and Audit Collusion:
Empirical Evidence from A Transitional Economy

1.

Introduction
Many researchers have tried to obtain empirical evidence of auditor independence.

Most prior research has focused on opinion shopping or audit switching (Ellingsen and
Frederic, 1986; Chow and Rice, 1982; Smith, 1986; Krishnan, 1994; Krishnan and
Stephens, 1995; Lennox, 2000), as it is argued that collusive behavior between
auditors and auditees can be detected only when companies switch auditors. However,
this point of view is flawed, because the possibility that audit collusion may have
occurred in the absence of auditor switching has been overlooked. This study aims to
examine whether collusion exists, and if so, to discover the determinants of audit
collusion in a transitional economy. I consider both switching and non-switching
situations. Using China as my testing sample, I find that audit collusion exist in
China’s capital market. Specifically, I find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are
more likely to engage in audit collusion, especially when they are in poor financial
condition. Whereas state-owned share concentration leads to audit collusion,
non-state-owned share concentration deters audit collusion because it aligns the
interests of the largest shareholder with those of the other shareholders and mitigates
the free-rider problem of small shareholders. Moreover, I find that audit collusion
tends to occur in regions in which the institutional environment is weak.
In contrast to previous research methods, which are designed to test opinion
shopping, I employ a two-stage logit regression to find empirical evidence of audit
collusion in China’s capital market. In the first stage, I develop an audit opinion
prediction model of high-quality Big-4 auditors, and introduce a two-step probit/logit
model to control for self-selection bias between auditees and auditors. Then I apply

-1-

this audit opinion prediction model from stage one to auditees of China’s local auditors,
and obtain an audit opinion for each firm in my sample. Audit collusion proxy is
defined as the discrepancy between the actual opinions that clients received from their
auditors and the opinions they would have received under similar circumstances from
a Big-4 auditor (considered a “typical” auditor)1. In the second stage, I regress the
difference in opinion on client and auditor characteristics and institutional variables to
detect the determinants of audit collusion in China.
Following prior studies, which find that China’s local auditors tend to issue
favorable reports under political pressure (e.g., DeFond, Wong, and Li, 1999; Chan,
Lin, and Mo, 2006), I expect that audit collusion exists in China’s capital market.
Specifically, I expect the ownership structure of listed firms, firm performance, and
institutional factors to affect the reporting behavior of auditors, in particular, local
auditors. I test my hypotheses by analyzing all companies listed on the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges during the 2001-2006 period. Consistent with my
expectations, I find empirical evidence that audit collusion exists in China’s capital
market. I find that SOEs demonstrating poor financial performance tend to collude
with their auditors, whereas non-SOEs, regardless of their financial performance, do
not tend to collude with their auditors. I also find that state-owned share concentration
leads to audit collusion, and that non-state-owned share concentration deters audit
collusion to some extent. Similar to the results of prior studies (e.g., Wang, Wong, and
Xia, 2005), my results show that audit collusion usually occurs in regions that have an
undeveloped market with strong government interference and relatively poor legal
enforcement.
1

This proxy follows the study by Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1987), which indicates that audit
qualification prediction model can serve as a benchmark to represent the probability that a “typical” auditor would
issue a qualified opinion under similar circumstances. This benchmark would be useful in peer review committees,
in debates about “opinion shopping”, in quality control procedures within firms, and in court cases involving
auditor negligence for not issuing qualified opinions.
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This paper contributes to the existing literature on audit opinion prediction and
audit collusion. First, I contribute to the audit collusion literature by providing
empirical evidence of the relation between ownership structure and audit collusion. I
find that SOEs have a self-enforcing side contract with their auditors, and that these
firms are more likely to take part in audit collusion. State-owned share concentration
leads to audit collusion, whereas non-state-owned share concentration mitigates the
free-rider problem of other shareholders and therefore deters audit collusion. In
addition, I test the effect of institutional environment on audit collusion. Consistent
with the existing literature, I find that audit collusion is more likely to occur in regions
that have a poor institutional environment. Second, I introduce a two-step probit/logit
model to control for self-selection bias between auditees and auditors in the audit
opinion prediction model, which is the first such model in the audit opinion prediction
literature and proves to be a prediction model with high precision of classification.
Further, I employ in my model a proxy for audit collusion, which is defined as the
discrepancy between the actual opinions that clients received from their auditors and
the opinions they would have received under similar circumstances from a “typical”
auditor. This collusion proxy enables the empirical testing of audit collusion theories,
unlike the case of traditional analytical models, and sheds light on the generation of
other proxies for collusion in organizations.
The present study extends and complements the study of Chan, Lin, and Mo (2006)
on audit quality in one important dimension. Whereas the main aim of the latter study
was to examine whether auditor opinions are affected by government political and
economic influences during the 1996-2002 period, the main aim of this study is to test
for the existence and determinants of audit collusion during the 2001-2006 period. To
the best of my knowledge, the present study is the first to provide empirical evidence
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of audit collusion in a transitional economy. Chan, Lin, and Mo (2006) find that local
auditors are more economically dependent on local clients and subject to greater
political influence from local governments than are non-local auditors, and are
inclined to issue favorable reports for local government-owned companies to mitigate
probable economic losses. I find that only SOEs demonstrating poor financial
performance collude with their auditors, whereas non-SOEs, regardless of their
financial performance, have little incentive to collude with local auditors. I also
provide a direct test to show the relationships among ownership structure, institutional
environment, and audit collusion, and find that state-owned share concentration leads
significantly to audit collusion, whereas non-state-owned share concentration deters
audit collusion. Further, my results show that audit collusion usually occurs in regions
that have an undeveloped market with strong government interference and relatively
poor legal enforcement.
This study has policy implications for both regulators and practitioners. The
finding that audit collusion exists in China suggests that government rules and
regulations alone are not sufficient to create a healthy audit market. Rather, the
government should improve the overall institutional environment through measures
such as the reduction of government ownership of firms, withdrawal of the
government from involvement in both the stock and audit markets, and development
of the legal environment.
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. The literature review and
hypotheses development are presented in the second section. The third section
includes the method and research design, which consists of the sample description and
data collection, a two-stage regression model involving an audit opinion prediction
model using capital market and firm-specific financial data, and a logit regression to
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ascertain the determinants of audit collusion in China’s capital market. The empirical
results and robustness tests are presented in the fourth section, and the conclusions are
given in the fifth section.
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2.

Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

2.1. Audit Collusion
Audit collusion is defined as the fraudulent behavior that occurs when an auditor
accepts a favor from the client, loses his or her professional independence, provides an
unfair and biased audit report, and issues the client an unwarranted favorable audit
opinion to meet the client’s special needs. In a traditional auditing model with adverse
selection and unobservable effort, a principal, the owner of the resources, hires an
auditor to monitor the agent who manages and acts on the principal’s behalf in order to
overcome information asymmetry. The agent usually has private information about the
true operation and performance of the firm and can use it to seek rents from the
principal for the agent’s own benefit. Here, the auditor’s task is to verify the agent’s
statement by issuing a fair and unbiased audit report. The transferred information that
the principal receives is based on both the agent’s claim and the auditor’s verification
of the agent’s claim.
A collusive agreement between an agent and auditor must be self-enforcing, that
is, neither the agent nor the auditor has an incentive to break the collusive agreement
when the counterpart does not do so (Baiman, Evans, and Nagarajan, 1991). A
fraudulent agent (the manager) has a strong incentive to bribe the auditor, but an
honest auditor will refuse the bribe and report the manager’s offer of a bribe. In this
scenario, the fraudulent agent is punished, and the honest auditor receives only the
audit fee offered by the principal. A dishonest auditor, however, will take the agent’s
bribe, help mask the agent’s misbehavior, and issue a favorable report that supports the
agent’s claim. In this scenario, the interests of the auditor and those of the agent are in
alignment. They make a side contract that is self-enforcing because both of the two
will be better off compared with the first scenario: the agent will use information rent
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extracted from the principal for the agent’s private use, and the auditor will get the
audit fee offered by the principal as well as the bribe the agent offered for colluding.
Kofman and Lawarree (1993) were the first to develop an analytical model to
distinguish honest from dishonest auditors. Most prior studies of audit collusion have
used analytical models of collusive behavior. However, very little empirical evidence
on audit collusion exists, because the decision whether or not to collude reflects a state
of mind and is not a permanent feature, and because the decision to collude can depend
on the different incentives faced by the auditor. Some researchers link collusive
behavior to auditor switching, as companies are free to select different auditors until
they find one who is willing to sacrifice his or her professional ethics for commercial
gain by participating in improper accounting practices (Ellingsen and Frederick, 1986).
Empirical evidence of opinion shopping is at best mixed, as different research methods
are employed. Chow and Rice (1982) find that companies are more likely to switch
auditors after receiving qualified opinions than after receiving unqualified opinions,
but they are no more likely to receive unqualified opinions in the year after switching
than are other non-switching companies. Smith (1986) conducts a case analysis and
reports that only five out of 139 companies are suspected of opinion shopping.
Krishnan (1994) finds that switchers receive conservative treatment relative to
non-switching clients. He points out that the receipt of conservative treatment, rather
than the receipt of qualified opinions, motivates auditor switching. Krishnan and
Stephens (1995) cannot find an example of successful opinion shopping, and attribute
this to the conservative treatment of switchers by both predecessor and successor
auditors. In contrast, Lennox (2000) finds empirical evidence of successful opinion
shopping in the U.K. He predicts the opinions that companies would have received had
they made opposite switching decisions. He finds that companies would have received
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unfavorable reports more often under different switching decisions, and interprets his
finding as evidence of successful opinion shopping.
The methods adopted in prior research are all based on the assumption that
auditors’ collusive behavior is unidentifiable from alternative sources, and that opinion
shopping detection must focus on the relation between the audit opinion and auditor
switching. However, this assumption is inadequate, as it does not consider the situation
in which the threat to switch results in the issuance of favorable opinions. That is,
favorable opinions are not necessarily a result of auditor switching. Non-switchers can
receive favorable opinions by threatening to switch to a new auditor. The shocking
audit scandal of Arthur Andersen and Enron was revealed in December 2001. The
management and the auditor of these two giants in their respective industries took
advantage of not only investors, but also the government and public as a whole, to
illegally increase their personal wealth. Arthur Andersen had been Enron’s auditor
ever since Enron’s foundation in 1985, and did not execute its duties independently
because of the huge amount of audit and consulting fees that Enron provided. A
similar case occurred in China. The CPA firm of Zhongtianqin (中天勤) was one of the
leading accounting firms in China prior to 2000. As the auditor of Yinguangxia (银广
夏 ) for seven consecutive years, Zhongtianqin assisted the client in fabricating
financial reports but issued clean audit reports. These cases indicate that companies
can get a favorable audit opinion without having to switch auditors.
More evidence comes from financial reporting enforcement. Financial reporting
enforcement is an external monitoring process that is intended to strengthen investors’
confidence in the accuracy of financial statements. China’s regulatory authorities may
take supervisory measures such as ordering a company to publish the errors that have
been identified in order to serve the public interest. For example, from 1997 to 2005,
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the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges required financial reporting of 101 and
124 listed firms, respectively, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) required financial reporting of another 308 listed firms. During the same
period of time, there were only 138 voluntary auditor changes (Chan, Lin, and Zhang,
2007). Although I assume that some of these 138 firms engaged in opinion shopping, it
is still a small proportion relative to the total number of firms that had questionable
financial statements and thus were required to comply with regulatory norms by stock
exchanges and the regulatory authority (101+124+308). This further illustrates that
auditor switching may not be a good indicator of audit collusion. Therefore, prior
empirical research on audit opinion shopping and audit collusion is incomplete.
Although many noted papers have found evidence of opinion shopping, very few find
evidence of collusive behavior between firms and auditors without auditor switching,
because the possibility that threatening to switch auditors may result in the issuance of
favorable audit opinions has been neglected.
2.2. Auditor-Client Self-Enforcing Side Contract and Audit Collusion
Although Chinese investors may perceive auditors to be more objective and more
neutral than the managers of SOEs, auditors have been found to collude with managers
in manipulating financial statements (Lei, 2005). To explain why Chinese auditors lose
their independence, a thorough understanding of the development of CPA firms in
China is necessary. In 1979, China undertook a revolutionary economic reform by
decentralizing SOEs, and began to attract foreign direct investment. Since then, the
Chinese government has realized the importance of external auditors for the healthy
development of the stock markets, which were established in the early 1990s. To
ensure audit quality, the central government granted permission to selected accounting
firms to audit listed companies. Because of the lack of capital, most audit firms were
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affiliated with local governments or government agencies. Government-affiliated
audit firms once dominated the audit market with 75% of shares in terms of numbers
of clients (DeFond et al., 1999). Sponsoring government agencies such as finance
bureaus, tax bureaus, bureaus in charge of different industries, or other local
government agencies often demanded that companies located within their
administrative territory be audited by their sponsored audit firms (Yang et al., 2001).
As a result, auditor judgment and the type of audit report issued were often affected by
the sponsoring local government agencies (Tang, 1999; Zhong, 1998), which severely
compromised auditor independence in China and led to a disaffiliation campaign in
1997. However, this campaign could not change the fact that most listed companies are
primarily owned by local governments, and the majority of local audit firms was
previously affiliated and had close connections with these governments (DeFond,
Wong, and Li, 1999; Tang, 1999; Yang, Tang, Kilgore, and Hong, 2001). Although
presently the audit firms appear to be independent and have no further connection with
local governments, private relationships (called guanxi in Chinese) still exist among
former colleagues and departments, and local governments can still exert influence on
audit firms in their jurisdictions through regulations administered by their finance
bureaus, audit bureaus, and local audit institutes (Tang, 1999; Zhong, 1998). These
audit firms are also dependent on the political influence of local government to acquire
more SOE clients, which is critical for an audit firm’s survival in the fiercely
competitive audit market. Hence, auditors who have greater economic dependence on
local clients and are subject to more political influence from local governments are
inclined to report favorably on SOEs to mitigate probable economic losses (Chan, Lin,
and Mo, 2006). Chan and Mo (2002) point out that respect for and obedience to local
authorities is important for maintaining good business relationships in China.
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Auditors in China have an undeniable incentive to collude with their SOE clients,
which are economically very important clients. An audit firm faces potential economic
losses if it follows professional criteria and issues reports that are unfavorable to its
SOE clients. Meanwhile, as the dominant shareholder of SOEs, the local government
will be impressed by an auditor’s willingness to collude in preparing false financial
reports, and hence may refer more SOE clients to that audit firm. However, SOE
managers do not have market-based incentives to demand high-quality auditors
(DeFond, Wong and Li, 1999). In China, companies with modified reports must
explain the nature and underlying reasons for the receipt of a modified report directly
to the CSRC (Chen, Su, and Zhao, 2000). Therefore, SOE managers have a strong
incentive to avoid modified audit opinions, which will probably bring them future
political and economic costs.
In this two-party game, auditors are generally considered to be “subordinates” and
SOEs to be “superiors” because of the power of SOEs to hire and fire auditors. In
dealing with subordinates, superiors often adopt a take-it-or-leave-it attitude.
Following the receipt of an unfavorable audit opinion in one year, some SOEs may
continue changing auditors in the following years until they finally find an auditor who
is willing to report leniently. Initial evidence shows that a successor auditor is more
cooperative and more likely to express a clean opinion (Li and Wu, 2002). DeFond,
Wong, and Li (1999) find that the top 10 audit firms, which are more professional and
independent, lose their market shares as a result of issuing modified audit opinions. As
illustrated above, SOEs exert strong political pressure on local auditors, and auditors
have incentives to report favorably to obtain greater economic benefits and political
protection. Hence, SOEs and local auditors have established collusive self-enforcing
contracts. The severe shortage of qualified accountants and auditors in China further
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hinders the development of professional auditing (Winkle et al., 1994; Graham, 1996).
Without an independent audit profession, any information provided by the auditor as a
third party assurance will be biased and hence unreliable.
In conclusion, SOEs exert strong political pressure on local auditors, and local
auditors have incentives to issue favorable reports for their SOE clients. Both SOEs
and local auditors are inclined to take part in audit collusion for their own benefit.
However, it is reasonable to expect that only SOEs with inferior financial performance
have strong incentives to collude with their auditors, whereas SOEs with superior
financial performance lack incentives to do so. Schwartz and Menon (1985) find that
failing firms have a greater tendency to switch auditors than do healthier firms, while
Lennox (2000) finds that companies strategically appoint auditors who are less likely
to issue going concern opinions and that failing companies successfully engage in
opinion shopping. However, non-SOEs have little ability to exert political pressure on
their auditors, and they will not take part in audit collusion. Hence, the first hypothesis
is stated as follows.
Hypothesis 1: SOEs demonstrating inferior financial performance are more likely to
take part in audit collusion, whereas non-SOEs and SOEs demonstrating superior
financial performance are less likely to take part in audit collusion.
2.3. Share Concentration and Audit Collusion
Concentrated share holdings enable control rights to match cash flow rights. Given
the amount of investment of large shareholders in a company, it is reasonable to expect
that they have strong incentives to monitor and discipline management to maximize
their benefits. The prior literature indicates that large shareholders tend to perform an
active role in corporate governance. For example, Franks and Mayer (2000) find that
in Germany, family-owned enterprises usually possess a large amount of shares
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through a pyramid structure, which enables the ultimate shareholders to have control
rights over the firm, but these large shareholders hold the shares only for the purpose
of controlling the firm. In addition, a strong relationship between board turnover and
poor firm performance has been found in German firms with concentrated ownership,
and has also been well documented in firms in other Anglo-Saxon countries (Franks
and Mayer, 2000). Yafeh and Yosha (2003) point out that large shareholders tend to
constrain managers’ excessive spending on projects that promote the managers’
interests but are not in line with the interests of the majority shareholders. Because the
free-rider problem associated with monitoring is mitigated under concentrated
ownership, Yafeh and Yosha (2003) argue that large shareholders tend to reduce
discretionary spending, such as advertisement expenditure. Moreover, large
shareholders usually combine their general interest in profit maximization and control
over the profit-making assets of the firm to have their interest respected (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997), and they are likely to desire a high-quality audit report and avoid
collusive behavior for the benefit of both the company and themselves.
One fundamental problem is that large shareholders will use their control rights to
maximize the company welfare only when the interests of large shareholders agree
with the interests of other shareholders. Large shareholders will probably expropriate
the interests of other shareholders if their personal goals are not consistent with those
of the other shareholders. For instance, government-owned enterprises tend not to
have profitability as their sole objective but rather have multiple objectives. Large
shareholders may view the acquisition of political capital and the development of their
personal relationship network as more important than profit. This phenomenon
prevails in many transitional economies such as China, India, and Vietnam because of
their relatively undeveloped economies and immature capital markets.
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In China, local governments regard listed SOEs as very precious shell resources.
First, the number of listed SOEs of a region is not only a symbol of the economic
prosperity of that region, but also represents the political achievements of the local
government. Therefore, politicians may care more about increasing the number of
listed firms in their region, which can enhance their chance of promotion, rather than
raising more capital (Li and Zhou, 2005). Being de-listed not only incurs economic
losses in the region, but also brings disgrace to the local government (Chen, Su, and
Zhao, 2000). Second, local governments often impose policy burdens on the listed
firms such as infrastructure development to provide relief for the region’s fiscal and
unemployment problems (Lin, Cai, and Li, 1998). A common strategy that a local
government often adopts is to use its authority to push the most profitable SOEs or
their subsidiaries to be listed. Once the enterprise is listed, the government will exert
political influence to maintain this valuable listed shell resource. The profit that listed
SOEs generate in the capital market can be transferred to unlisted SOEs or related
parties, a process usually referred to as “tunneling,” to help avoid the bankruptcy of
unlisted SOEs or related parties, since the collapse of an SOE can cause widespread
unemployment and social disharmony. Third, to raise capital through a rights offering,
listed companies are required to report a return on equity (ROE) greater than or equal
to 10% for at least three consecutive years. Furthermore, a company will be de-listed if
it reports a negative ROE for three consecutive years (Haw et al., 2005). As these
accounting numbers can be easily manipulated through the opportunistic use of
accounting accruals, local governments have strong incentives to direct management
to report earnings that meet the requirements. To do so, the local governments need to
select an auditor who will not challenge such reporting (Aharony et al., 2000; DeFond
et al., 1999). The extant literature indicates that when the large shareholder is the
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government, the interest that the large shareholder pursues is different from that of the
other shareholders, which is the maximization of their wealth. As large shareholders of
SOEs have incentives to expropriate other shareholders in order to meet their specific
political goals, they are more like to collude with obedient auditors to cover this
expropriation.
Hence, I expect that share concentration leads to audit collusion when the
interests of large shareholders do not coincide with the interests of other shareholders.
Specifically, if large shareholders are private investors (e.g., institutional
shareholders), their goal is to maximize profit in the most efficient way, and thus they
need high-quality auditors to verify financial data in order to reduce information
asymmetry. Share concentration in the hands of private, institutional investors is likely
to deter audit collusion. However, if the large shareholders are local governments, they
will have multiple goals that have little to do with profit maximization. Large
shareholders of SOEs require obedient auditors who will abandon their professional
ethics and issue favorable audit opinions in order to mask the expropriation of other
shareholders by the large shareholders. Therefore, I hypothesize that share
concentration of SOEs in the hands of local governments will result in audit collusion.
The more shares are owned by the government, the more likely the SOEs will take part
in audit collusion. Therefore, the following hypothesis regarding share concentration
and audit collusion is proposed.
Hypothesis 2: Share concentration in SOEs leads to audit collusion, whereas share
concentration in non-SOEs deters audit collusion.
2.4. Institutional Environment and Audit Collusion
A few studies point out that financial reporting quality is influenced by the
political environment (Bushman et al., 2004; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Ball et
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al., 2000), and that SOEs tend to choose low-quality auditors in regions characterized
by a poor institutional environment for ease of collusion (Wang, Wong, and Xia, 2005).
Three aspects of institutional environment are considered here: the degree of
government involvement in the economy, the capital market development in a specific
administrative region, and the degree of shareholder protection, or legal enforcement.
Little direct evidence has been found of the relation between audit collusion and
institutional environment. That is, few papers have explored whether audit collusion is
more likely to occur in regions with a poor institutional environment, whether SOEs
behave differently from non-SOEs in the same institutional environment in terms of
audit collusion, or whether a good institutional environment deters the formation of a
collusive self-enforcing contract between SOEs and tractable auditors.
Since the launch of the economic decentralization reform in 1978, China’s central
government has relaxed its absolute control over the allocation of economic resources
to local governments, and granted local governments more autonomy to promote
economic growth in their administrative region. Because of the different endeavors of
local governments and different locations that create different opportunities for
economic development, a great heterogeneity across provinces in terms of
marketization and institutional quality exists in China’s capital market (Wang, Wong,
and Xia, 2005). Therefore, China provides a unique setting for testing the effect of the
institutional environment on audit collusion within one country. Following prior
studies, I expect that collusion is associated with a weak institutional environment, and
that audit collusion is more likely to occur in regions in which the local governments
have a high degree of involvement in the economy, the credit market is
underdeveloped, and legal protection of minority shareholder interests is relatively low.
As mentioned earlier, unlike non-state owners, local governments have incentives to
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use SOEs as platforms to fulfill their political goals, such as upgrading their
administrative ranking, reducing the regional unemployment rate, and tunneling
profits to help other SOEs in the same region avoid bankruptcy. Local auditors are
influenced by political pressure from local governments and economically dependent
on their SOE clients. As a result, they often have to issue favorable reports for their
SOE clients in order to survive in the highly competitive audit market. This kind of
self-enforcing side contract is very common among China’s auditors and SOEs. Wang,
Wong, and Xia (2005) find that auditors are more lenient only towards SOEs, and not
towards non-state-owned firms. They argue that local governments may use political
power to undermine the independence of auditors and force auditors to take part in
collusion. Hence, I expect that as non-SOEs have no ability to exert political pressure
on their auditors, auditors will not collude with their non-SOE clients regardless of the
kind of institutional environment in which their clients operate. Therefore, the third
hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 3: Audit collusion is more likely to occur in regions with a poor
institutional environment than in regions with a good institutional environment, and
SOEs are less likely to collude with their auditors in regions with a good institutional
environment than with those in regions with a poor institutional environment.
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3.

Research Method

3.1. Data Collection
The China Securities Markets and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database is the
primary source of financial information on the listed companies that issued A shares in
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Stock market data and audit opinion type
are acquired from the Wind database. Information related to audit firms such as firm
location and auditor identity are collected from the official Web site of the Chinese
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA).

2

Corporate governance

information of listed companies is obtained from the China Center for Economic
Research (CCER) database. To be retained in my sample, firms must have complete
financial and audit information for hypothesis testing. Financial institutions and
insurance companies are excluded from the sample because their business and
financial reporting requirements are different from those of other listed companies.
The observations of firms that are located in Tibet are also excluded because three
regional institutional indices are not available for Tibet. In addition, I trim off the
outliers that fall outside three standard deviations from the mean to get rid of extreme
values. Panel A of Table 1 shows that my sample consists of 5,268 firm-year
observations of Chinese listed companies over the 2001-2006 period.

[Insert Table 1 here]

Although the number of firms that are included in the sample increases annually,
the proportion of Big 4 auditees to non-Big 4 auditees is roughly the same for each
year. SOEs account for a very large portion of my sample, reaching the highest
percentage of all firms in 2001 (84.62%) and the lowest percentage in 2006 (67.60%),
2

The official Web site for the CICPA is www.cicpa.org.cn
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which is consistent with the fact that most listed companies in China’s capital market
are ultimately controlled by the government. Panel B presents the client composition
of two types of auditors during the sample period. The table shows that 84% of Big 4
clients and 75% of non-Big 4 clients are owned by the government. Again, SOEs
account for a great proportion of auditors’ clients, and auditors in China have a heavy
economic dependence on their SOE clients. Panel C of Table 1 shows the descriptive
statistics on the frequencies of clean versus modified audit opinions that Big 4 and
non-Big 4 auditors issued during the sample period. DeFond, Wong, and Li (1999)
point out that large auditors have the greatest propensity to issue modified reports.
However, panel C indicates that, on average, Big 4 auditors issued significantly fewer
modified auditor opinions than did non-Big 4 auditors (6.09% vs. 9.66%, respectively).
One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that Big 4 auditors usually serve large
clients that are in better financial condition and have better internal control, and as a
result, their clients are less likely to be issued qualified opinions. This discrepancy in
the number of modified opinions also indicates that auditees are not randomly
assigned to their auditors and that they select auditors according to firm characteristics,
such as financial condition, corporate governance, and institutional factors. The
variable definitions and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2 in panel A and
panel B, respectively.

[Insert Table 2 here]

Table 3 reports the descriptive information of client firm characteristics divided
by class of auditor. ANOVA F-statistics for equality of means and the Wilcoxon test of
differences in medians are employed. The last column shows that most of the variables
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that denote firm characteristics are significantly different between Big 4 and non-Big 4
groups. For example, firms with a higher current ratio, higher return of equity, and
lower receivables and inventory ratios tend to select Big 4 auditors, whereas firms that
received a modified audit opinion in previous years or are currently experiencing
losses tend to choose non-Big 4 auditors. In addition, firms located in regions with a
poor institutional environment are more likely to select non-Big 4 auditors, whereas
firms that have an internal audit committee are more likely to hire Big 4 auditors.
These comparisons between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditees indicate that auditors are not
randomly allocated to listed firms; rather, firms probably self-select auditors according
to their firm characteristics.

[Insert Table 3 here]

3.2. Model Specifications
3.2.1. Stage One: Audit Opinion Prediction Model
Researchers use different methods to predict audit uncertainty qualifications.
Beaver (1966) employs a univariate approach using a paired classification technique to
predict failure on the basis of financial ratios. Altman (1968) uses multi-discriminant
analysis to predict failure. Castagna and Matolcsy (1981) develop a quadratic
discriminant analysis technique to examine the predictive ability of selected financial
ratios to discriminate between failed and surviving companies. Mutchler (1985) and
Bell and Tabor (1991) use financial variables to develop auditors’ going-concern
evaluations of firms. Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1987) introduce capital
market variables to the prediction model and estimate the type of audit opinion based
on both financial and market variables. Chen, Marshall, Zhang, and Ganesh (2006)
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predict the financial distress of companies in China. They argue that the logit model is
the optimal prediction model with the best classification ability.
These approaches, although straightforward, rely on at least three implicit
assumptions. First, the opinion prediction model assumes that Big 4 and non-Big 4
auditors use the same audit structure when issuing audit opinions. This assumption can
be restrictive, as it does not allow for interactive effects between auditor type and firm
characteristics and ignores differences in the demand for Big 4 auditors. Studies
indicate that Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors report differently in China’s capital market.
Political pressure from the local government has little influence on Big 4 auditors.
DeFond, Wong, and Li (1999) point out that Big 4 auditors usually serve the clients
that demand higher quality audit reports. Hence, Big 4 auditors issue independent
reports in China’s auditing market. Chan, Lin, and Mo (2006) find that local auditors,
who have greater economic dependence on local clients and are subject to more
political pressure from local governments than non-local auditors, are inclined to
report favorably on local government-owned enterprises to mitigate probable
economic losses. Second, the underlying assumption of the traditional audit opinion
prediction model is that auditors’ decision rules do not vary with the institutional
environment. Fan and Wang (2003) provide evidence that institutional development is
not uniform across the China. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) show that accounting
standards are not the only determinant of reporting behavior, and that economic and
political variables profoundly affect financial reporting practice. Hence, it is
reasonable to argue that auditors will adjust their decision rules based on the
institutional environment of the region in which their clients operate. Finally, and most
importantly, the model implicitly assumes that auditors are randomly allocated to
client firms. However, as suggested by Copley et al. (1995) and Ireland and Lennox
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(2002), auditor choice is likely to be endogenous. Because client firms are not
randomly assigned to audit firms, it is probable that firms self-select Big 4 or non-Big
4 auditors based on firm characteristics, private information, and/or other
unobservable characteristics.
Theoretical studies (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Datar et al., 1991) use signaling
models to explore the self-selection of auditors by clients, and there is a common
perception that clients self-select their auditors. From an econometric perspective,
self-selection introduces a bias in the logit audit opinion prediction model. To address
this point more specifically, consider the following equation:
Auditor choice equation: Big 4i = αZ i + u i

(1)

Audit opinion prediction model: Opinion0 i = β 0 X i + v0 i if Big 4 i = 0

(2)

Opinion1i = β 1 X i + v1i if Big４i = 1 ,

(3)

where X i and Z i are vectors of the exogenous variables and the error terms, ui , v0 i ,
and v1i are assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero. The
variance-covariance matrix is given by
⎡σ 00
Co var iance( v0 i , v1i ,u i ) = ⎢⎢σ 01
⎢⎣σ 0 u

σ 01 σ 0 u ⎤
σ 11 σ 1u ⎥⎥ .
σ 1u σ uu ⎥⎦

Standard logit regressions of audit opinion prediction models are potentially
misspecified. To show this, take the conditional expectations of the residuals in
equations (2) and (3), respectively:
⎡ φ ( −αZ i ) ⎤
E( v0 i Big 4i = 0 ) = −σ 0 u ⎢
⎥
⎣Φ ( −αZ i ) ⎦
⎡ φ ( −αZ i )
E( v1i Big 4i = 1 ) = −σ 1u ⎢
⎣ 1 − Φ ( −αZ i
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⎤
⎥,
)⎦

where the functions φ and Φ are the standard normal probability density
function and the cumulative distribution function, respectively; σ 0 u and σ 1u are the
covariance of the residuals from the non-Big 4 and Big 4 audit opinion prediction
regressions, respectively, and the residuals from the auditor choice equation. In the
above equations, if σ 0 u ≠ 0 or σ 1u ≠ 0 , then the conditional expectation is nonzero,
causing the logit regression to be misspecified and the estimated coefficients to be
biased. Although researchers can directly control for many client characteristics,
characteristics that are not observable to them may affect both audit opinion issuance
and auditor choice and thereby cause bias. Ireland and Lennox (2002) point out that
the quality of internal accounting controls and management integrity are potentially
important characteristics that are unobservable to researchers. Studies indicate that
companies with strong internal control and superior management integrity are more
likely to choose high-quality auditors (Thornton and Moore, 1993), and that they are
more likely to get unqualified audit opinions. These unobservable client characteristics
affect both auditor choice ( u i ) and audit opinion issuance ( vi ), and make E( u i vi ) ≠ 0 ,
that is, σ 0 u ≠ 0 and σ 1u ≠ 0 . Therefore, standard logit regressions of audit opinion
prediction models are potentially misspecified and the estimated coefficients are
biased.
Heckman (1979) derives a two-step method to correct for selectivity bias in linear
regression models with normal errors, and Dubin and Rivers (1989) apply the same
basic conceptual framework to logit and probit models, and develop a two-stage
binary probit method to control for self-selection bias in discrete-choice models.
Following prior studies, I introduce the probit/logit two-stage method to control for
selection effects. First, I estimate a probit auditor selection model and use the results to
generate the inverse Mills ratios. Next, I include the inverse Mills ratios in audit
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opinion prediction models for the clients of Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors to correct for
selectivity bias. The estimated coefficients of audit opinion prediction models will be
biased if the inverse Mills ratios are omitted from the regression. The self-selection
model is given as follows.
Auditor Choice:
m

n

k =1

k =1

Probit ( Big 4 i ) = α 0 + ∑ δ m Financial _ Variablesim + ∑ φ n Capital _ Market _ Variablesin
+ α 1 In _ Audit i + α 2 Priori + α 3 Institutioni + u i
(4)
Audit Opinion Prediction:
m

n

k =1

k =1

Logit (Opinioni ) = β 0 + ∑ γ m Financial _ Variables im + ∑ λ n Capital _ Market _ Variables in
+ β 1 Priori + β 2 Institutioni + vi

(5)
The descriptive statistics and definitions of these variables given above are
presented in Table 2. Consistent with previous research, I expect that client firm
characteristics, firm private information, and institutional factors affect both auditor
choice and audit opinion issuance.
(i) Variables Included in Both the Auditor Choice and Opinion Prediction Model
Financial variables, that is, total assets, current ratio, leverage, return on equity
(ROE), and current year loss, are included to reflect the financial condition of the firms.
The literature indicates that these variables are successful in predicting firm financial
distress (Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1987). I expect that firms with larger
assets and a higher current ratio and ROE are in good financial condition. Similarly, I
expect low-leverage firms to be less close to bankruptcy and hence they are less likely
to be issued qualified opinions. The ratios of receivables and inventory to total assets
are considered as they may capture an auditor’s potential exposure to litigation risk. St.
Pierre and Anderson (1984) survey accounting and auditing disputes in 130 lawsuits
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against auditors and find a high frequency of suits involving inventory and receivables.
These variables suggest that a qualified audit opinion is more likely if a firm is in poor
financial condition. Therefore, I expect firms in good financial condition with lower
litigation risk to be more likely to receive a clean audit opinion and hence they may
self-select Big 4 auditors to signal the market.
Prior studies find that the type of audit opinion is highly persistent (Lennox, 2000),
that is, if a firm is issued a qualified opinion by its auditor in one year, it is more likely
to receive a qualified audit opinion in the following year. Usually, auditor change and
interactions with the previous audit opinion significantly influence the successor
auditor’s opinion. In the logit model, a dummy variable representing the prior year’s
audit opinion is included to measure the auditor’s concern with the firm’s overall
performance. I expect that when a firm is issued a modified opinion in one year, it is
more likely to be issued a qualified opinion in the following year. To avoid receiving
another qualified opinion, the firm is likely to switch from a high-quality auditor to a
low-quality auditor. Since 1992, some listed companies in China have been authorized
to issue B shares, which are denominated in foreign currencies to foreign investors.
These companies are required to prepare an additional set of financial statements for
foreign investors according to International Accounting Standards (IAS). Companies
with foreign ownership are generally larger and there is greater demand for quality
financial reports from foreign owners; these companies also have incentives to hire
high-quality auditors (DeFond, Wong, and Li, 1999). Hence, a B-share variable is used
to control for the confounding effect of differential demand for quality financial
information (Chan, Lin, and Mo, 2006).
Stock market variables are included as potential determinants of auditor choice
and audit qualification decision (Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1987) for two
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reasons. First, market return measures capture information above and beyond that
reported in financial statements. Good news, such as unrealized gains, potential
investment opportunities, or a successful outcome from R&D, and bad news, such as
possible litigation involvement and loss of market share due to outdated technology,
cannot be reflected in financial statements, but can be forecasted by analysts and
sophisticated investors and reflected in stock prices. Market return measures may be
correlated with the auditor’s information set, or the auditor may use market return
measures to infer information incorporated in market prices. Ohlson (1980) argues that
stock market variables improve the predictive ability of financial distress prediction
models. Beaver (1968) suggests that changes in stock price are more timely predictors
of bankruptcy than are univariate financial statement variables. Chen et al. (2006)
introduced capital market value in the financial distress prediction model in China.
Following these literature, I use a firm-specific beta calculated from the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) model to proxy market return and expect it to be positively
related with choosing a Big 4 auditor and getting a clean audit opinion. I expect that
the higher the firm market return, the more likely is the firm to choose a Big 4 auditor,
and the more likely the firm will get a clean audit report. Second, stock price
fluctuation can capture information about the firm’s future performance; however,
conflicting interpretations coexist of the expected sign of fluctuation. Lawsuits against
auditors usually take place after the value of the equity falls precipitously because
plaintiffs need only to establish reliance on financial statements that did not disclose
major uncertainties. The greater the fluctuation of a firm’s returns, the higher is the
probability of a large decline in stock price. Nevertheless, a huge positive fluctuation
can also demonstrate soaring performance, and firms with huge positive fluctuations
have incentives to self-select Big 4 auditors to verify their financial reports and send a
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positive signal to the capital market. Therefore, a variable, Fluctuations, which equals
the standard deviation of stock prices, is included in the logit model to capture the
uncertainty of earnings. The expected coefficient of Fluctuations is mixed.
The difficulty of the audit engagement may be due to the complexity of the
specific client, but it may also be a function of the complexity of the client industry (St.
Pierre and Anderson, 1984). Specific industry audit guides attest to the fact that
industries are differentially complex. Warren (1980) finds that the incidence of
qualified opinions is a function of the industry group. In the audit opinion prediction
model, I introduce the deviation between firm returns and industry average returns to
control for different environments due to different industries. I use the CSRC industry
classification system, which comprises twelve categories, to measure industry effect.
The finance and insurance industry is excluded in the logit regression because there
are great differences in operating and reporting between the finance and insurance
industry and other industries. I also control for year effects for both auditor choice and
audit opinion issuance to account for changes in the macroeconomic environment.
In contrast to prior studies, I introduce three institutional indices to measure
institutional heterogeneity across different administrative regions across China 3
(Wang, Wong, and Xia, 2005). The government involvement index is based on
government spending as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP), the size of
SOEs in a province, and the number of government administrative regulations. The
market index is a measurement of credit market development, which is calculated by
the percentage of deposits taken by non-state financial institutions and the percentage
of short-term loans to the non-state sector. Finally, the legal environment index is
3

These three indices, which consist of credit market index, government market involvement index and legal
environment index, are based on the China’s marketization data in 2002 by Fan and Wang (2003). The regression in
the model uses provincial rankings for institution heterogeneity. The latest version of China’s marketization report
is based on data in 2005. Nevertheless, Fan and Wang indicate that there are no significantly marketization changes
in terms of provincial rankings.
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measured by the number of lawyers as a percentage of the population in the region.
The number of lawyers is a proxy for a region’s legal environment. These indices are
shown in Appendix 1. Rank transformation of the sum of the three institutional indices
is adopted in both the auditor choice and audit opinion prediction models. Following
the literature, in which differences in institutional environment are associated with
variation in financial reporting quality, and specifically, economies with more
market-oriented characteristics, including stronger professional accounting bodies and
higher expected litigation costs, are associated with better reporting quality (Ball,
Robin, and Wu, 2003), I expect a good institutional environment to result in demand
for higher quality auditors.
(ii) Variables Included Only in the Auditor Choice Model
The self-selection model can be estimated only if it satisfies the identification
condition, which requires that vectors X i and Z i have elements that are not in
common. The variable In_Audit, which is a dummy variable indicating whether the
listed firm has an internal audit committee, fulfills this role.
I expect that the existence of an internal audit committee is positively related with
choosing a Big 4 auditor for at least two reasons. First, firms that choose to establish an
internal audit committee are inclined to have better management integrity and internal
control systems. A good internal control environment can act as a guarantee of
high-quality financial information. It is reasonable to assume that firms with an
internal audit committee have the ability and motivation to produce higher quality
financial reports. Second, if the audit committee carries out its duties well, firms have
the confidence to invite high-quality auditors to verify their financial reports. This
voluntary selection of Big 4 auditors will send a positive signal to the capital market,
and distinguish the firms from other firms.
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(iii) Variables Included Only in the Audit Opinion Prediction Model
The inverse Mills ratio is included in the audit opinion prediction model. This
controls for the fact that I do not observe the audit opinion companies would have
received if they had chosen audit firms of alternative size. To be specific, the
coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio of the Big 4 group tells us the audit opinion the
companies would have received if they had chosen non-Big 4 auditors rather than Big
4 auditors.
I expect that Big 4 auditees are firms that perform very well and desire
high-quality audit reports. If they get clean audit opinions from Big 4 auditors, it is
reasonable to expect that they would also get clean opinions from non-Big 4 auditors.
In addition, firms that receive modified opinions from Big 4 auditors would probably
get clean opinions from non-Big 4 auditors, because non-Big 4 auditors may be less
competent and less independent. Therefore, the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio
for the Big 4 group should be negative, as Big 4 auditees would have received a greater
number of clean audit opinions if they had chosen non-Big 4 auditors. I expect the
direction of adjustment of the inverse Mills ratio is negative in the second step of the
Heckman logit regression for audit prediction by Big 4 auditors.
3.2.2. Generating a Proxy for Audit Collusion
Previous studies of audit collusion, such as those of Tirole (1986), Kofman and
Lawarree (1996), and Peyrache and Quesada (2005), usually focus on the analytical
results from the agency problem and incentive theory perspectives. Several studies
(Ellingsen and Frederic, 1986; Chow and Rice, 1982; Smith, 1986; Krishnan, 1994;
Krishnan and Stephens, 1995; Lennox, 2000) employ an empirical regression model to
find evidence of the existence of collusive firms and auditors. However, these studies
usually focus on opinion shopping, and use auditor switching and subsequent opinions
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as proxies for collusion. Empirical studies have found little evidence of success in
opinion shopping because auditors tend to treat switchers more conservatively than
non-switchers in their opinion decisions (Krishnan, 1994). Although some studies find
empirical evidence of opinion shopping (Lennox, 2000), these studies focus on
collusive behavior in the case of auditor switching, and overlook the possibility of
audit collusion without switching. In this paper, I introduce a proxy for audit collusion
in terms of the difference between the predicted opinion and actual opinion of non-Big
4 auditors in China, and expect this variable can capture the existence of audit
collusion in both auditor switching and non-switching circumstances.
I assume that Big 4 auditors are more professional and carry out their verification
duties independently for two reasons. First, DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as
the joint probability of detecting and reporting material financial statement errors, and
points out that larger audit firms have incentives to supply a higher level of audit
quality. She argues that large auditors have more clients, and their good reputation
enables these auditors to remain active in the competitive audit market and
consistently make profit from their clients. It is not a real bargain if the auditor
sacrifices independence and reports favorably for specific clients, as such an auditor
will lose more clients because of its ruined reputation. DeAngelo suggests that auditor
size can be used as a proxy for audit quality. Second, Big 4 firms appear to be brand
name producers in the audit market (Francis and Wilson, 1988). Renown is the most
important goal of these international audit firms rather than the limited rents they
could generate from occasional audit collusion. Furthermore, Fan and Wong (2005)
find that Big 5 auditors do have a corporate governance role in emerging markets, and
Big 5 auditors generally play a more important governance functions in countries
where legal institutions are weak than in countries where legal institutions are strong
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(Choi and Wong, 2007). Consistent with the literature, I expect that Big 4 auditors
hold high reputations and are high-quality audit suppliers in China’s capital market.
The audit quality of China’s local auditors, however, is mixed. On the one hand,
some researchers (DeFond, Wong, and Li, 1999) ague that China’s top 10 auditors (in
terms of audit fee revenues) provide high-quality audits. Government authorities and
bureaucrats make great efforts to regulate the top 10 auditors in order to create a
healthy capital market and build domestic auditors’ brand names for competition with
international Big 4 auditors. On the other hand, Chan, Lin, and Mo (2006) argue that
China’s local auditors usually have greater economic dependence on local clients and
are subject to more political influence from local governments than non-local auditors.
Therefore, local auditors are inclined to report favorably on local government-owned
enterprises to mitigate probable economic losses. To generate a proxy for audit
collusion, I put the firm characteristics of non-Big 4 auditees into the logit audit
opinion prediction model estimated using Big 4 auditees’ data, and estimate a series of
audit opinions for non-Big 4 auditees. This step tells us what the audit opinion of these
non-Big 4 auditees would have been if they had been audited by a typical independent
auditor.
Specifically, if the predicted audit opinion is the same as the actual opinion that
the listed firm received for that fiscal year, it is assumed that no audit collusion exists
and the proxy for audit collusion equals zero. If the predicted audit opinion is clean and
the actual audit opinion is modified, it is still assumed that no audit collusion exists
because the auditors already reported independently. However, if the predicted opinion
is modified and actual audit opinion is clean, the audit collusion proxy is set to equal
one to denote the existence of audit collusion between the auditor and auditee.
3.2.3. Stage Two － Audit Collusion Determinant Testing Model
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In the second stage of the regression, I try to test my hypotheses and identify the
determinants of audit collusion. I include four kinds of variables in the regression,
including SOE indicators and their interaction terms, corporate governance
characteristics, financial information, and institutional factors. The inverse Mills ratios
are included to control for the self-selection problem between auditees and auditors. I
also control for year effects to explain changes in the macroeconomic environment.
(i) SOE Indicators
The government is the ultimate owner of SOEs, and these firms can bring the
government benefits other than profits. The number of listed SOEs in a specific region
is regarded as not only a political achievement by the local government’s leaders, but
also a symbol of economic prosperity that determines the officers’ opportunities for
promotion to higher positions. In addition, SOEs bear many burdens of the local
government, by over-hiring employees to reduce the unemployment rate in that region,
tunneling profits to other SOEs in the same area to prevent these firms from going
bankrupt, or financing infrastructure construction in the region. The local government
has strong incentive to use every means to keep SOEs listed in order to fulfill all of
these objectives. However, auditors who previously were affiliated with local
governments, and are still under political pressure by government and financial
bureaus, have a heavy economic dependence on their SOE clients, which constitute a
great proportion of their total clientele. I introduce SOE as an indicator to capture the
collusive behavior between auditors and their SOE clients, and expect the coefficient
to be positive if SOEs take part in audit collusion. Here, SOE is defined as a firm the
ultimate owner of which is the government. I use one minus dummy variable SOE to
represent the firms that have non-government shareholders as their ultimate
shareholders. Because these firms cannot exert political influence over auditors, I
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expect that these non-SOEs do not take part in audit collusion and the predicted sign is
negative.
I also employ some interaction terms to test my hypotheses. I calculate a proxy,
Pfmc, for firm financial status from all financial variables to verify the relation
between financial condition and audit collusion. Pfmc is a rank transformation
calculated from the rankings of all financial variables. I rank each financial variable
from good to bad, sum up all the financial variable rankings, and get a final number for
each firm observation in the sample. Then, I rank these numbers upward, assign the
first half of these firms a value of 0 for their pfmc variable, which means the firm is in
good financial condition, and assign the other half of the firms a value of 1 for their
pfmc variable. Similarly, the interactions between a non-SOE and its financial status
indicators are introduced. Consistent with my hypotheses, I expect that only SOEs in
poor financial condition are likely to be involved in audit collusion, and if so, the
coefficient for the interaction of SOE and loss should be positive. In contrast, other
firms, including SOEs in good financial condition, and non-SOEs in either good or
poor financial condition, will not take part in collusive behavior, and all coefficients
for these three interactions are expected to be significantly negative.
I also include the interactions between the SOE indicator and percentage that the
largest shareholder holds in listed firms to test the differential effects that share
concentration will have on audit collusion in firms of different types of ownership. The
largest shareholders in SOEs do not have the same interests as non-state shareholders;
hence, they are likely to expropriate other shareholders. I hypothesize that share
concentration in SOEs will lead to audit collusion, and that concentrated non-state
ownership will deter audit collusion. Therefore, the expected sign for the interaction of
SOE and the share percentage of the largest shareholder should be positive, and the
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coefficient of the interaction of non-SOE and largest shareholder ownership
percentage is expected to be negative.
(ii) Corporate Governance and Financial Characteristics
In contrast to prior studies, I introduce a new variable, Age, which equals the
average age of top-level managers of a listed firm. I use this variable to proxy the
working experience of managers, and expect that the more experienced senior
managers are, the less likely they will take part in audit collusion. The underlying
reason is twofold. First, experienced managers are more sophisticated in controlling
and organizing listed firms, and good management guarantees that firms operate in a
more effective and efficient way. A well-managed firm is more likely to be a profit
entity and hence has less motivation to take part in audit collusion. Second,
experienced managers have a better understanding of the detrimental consequences
that audit collusion will bring to their firms and the legal obligations they will incur if
such collusive behavior is exposed to the public. Sophisticated managers will be more
cautious when considering audit collusion as a way to mask their poor performance.
Hence, experienced managers are less likely to be involved in audit collusion
compared with inexperienced managers. The prior literature indicates that firms
usually receive a favorable audit opinion after switching auditors. Therefore, the
coefficient on the variable Switch is expected to be positive. Independent Ratio
denotes the ratio of independent board of directors to the total number of directors, and
I expect that a more independent board of directors will lead to less audit collusion.
The relation between the independent ratio and audit collusion should be negative. A
dummy variable Delisting is included to capture the profitability regulations the firms
are required to meet. CSRC mandates that any listed firm with losses for three
successive years can be delisted at discretion of regulators. I define variable Delisting

- 34 -

equals to one if this listed firm already has two consecutive losses in previous years,
and intend to use this dummy variable to reflect the firm’s exposure to delisting
punishment. The relation between delisting threat and the participant of auditing
collusion is mixed. On one hand, Haw et al. (2005) find that listed firms in China
manipulate their earnings in order to meet security regulations. From this aspect, firms
that engage in earnings management might collude with their auditors to mask their
misbehavior, and a positive relation between delisting dummy and audit collusion is
suggested. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2001) point out that profitability
requirements exacerbate managers’ propensity to engage in earnings management,
however, this tendency of manipulation positively associated with receiving modified
audit opinions. Therefore, auditors may treat their clients that could be delisted in the
next fiscal year more conservatively, and hence, are less likely to collude with such
clients.
Consistent with my hypotheses, I expect that firms with superior financial
performance will be disinclined to take part in audit collusion. Specifically, firms with
larger assets and a higher current ratio and ROE, and lower leverage, receivables, and
inventory are less likely to be involved in audit collusion. Because the performance of
firms is highly consistent, I also expect that firms that received a modified audit
opinion in the previous year will have demonstrated poor performance in the current
year, and have a strong incentive to collude with their auditors. Similarly, firm capital
market performance should have a positive relationship with audit collusion. DeFond
et al. (1999) introduced a time-listed variable and argue that older clients are more
susceptible to financial distress. Therefore, keeping other conditions constant,
companies after being listed for some years are more likely to engage in earnings
management to meet the regulatory profitability requirements and thus receive a
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qualified opinion than are newly listed firms (Chen et al., 2000). I expect audit
collusion has a positive relationship with time listed.
(iii) Institutional Factors and Inverse Mills Ratios
The prior literature indicates that institutional factors affect auditor decisions. The
three indices borrowed from Fan and Wang are designed to capture the influence of
institutional factors on audit collusion. I use rank transformation of these three factors
to form one institutional variable because these three indices are highly correlated and
the rankings are stable, and reveal the relative institutional status of each
administrative region. Market rank denotes the development of a capital market. The
more developed a capital market is, the more sensitively its investors react to financial
information, hence it is more difficult for listed firms to collude with their auditors
because of investor monitoring. A government index is used to measure the degree of
government involvement. Strong government interference means more political
pressure on auditors, and more audit collusion. In addition, a sound legal system and
very strong enforcement will lead to higher litigation risk for both parties that are
involved in audit collusion, so it is reasonable to assume that audit collusion occurs
less frequently in a good legal environment than in a bad legal environment. Therefore,
I expect a poor institutional environment leads to audit collusion.
The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio indicates what the situation would be like
if the other group were selected. Big 4 auditors are expected to be less involved in
audit collusion than their counterparts. The inverse Mills ratio denotes what the
situation would be if I tested audit collusion using Big 4 auditees. As I elaborated
above, it is easy to conceive that Big 4 auditees are less likely to take part in audit
collusion, so all the coefficients of the inverse Mills ratios are expected to be negative.
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4. Results

4.1. Audit Opinion Prediction Model
Table 4 presents the results for the first-step probit regression of self-selecting Big
4 auditors. The table shows that firms with an internal audit committee have a strong
preference to select Big 4 auditors. Firms that are large in terms of assets and have a
higher current ratio tend to choose Big 4 auditors, whereas firms that have greater
long-term debt and more inventory try to avoid high-quality auditors for their financial
reports. B share has a positive relation with self-selected Big 4 auditors as expected.
Stock price fluctuation positively contributes to self-selected high-quality auditors.
One possible explanation is that listed firms with high stock price variations might be
going through a period of expansion that could lead to greater future trade volume.
These growing firms tend to self-select large auditors to verify their financial
statements in order to send a positive signal to the capital market. Institutional factors
may affect the behavior patterns of financial report issuers; therefore, listed firms in a
poor institutional environment are inclined to avoid high-quality auditors for ease of
audit collusion, and the sign for institutional index ranking transformation is
significantly negative, as I expected.

[Insert Table 4 here]

Table 5 represents the statistical output of the second-step opinion prediction logit
model with and without the inverse Mills ratios for Big 4 auditors. When running the
logit regression without the inverse Mills ratios, some of the coefficients (e.g., current
ratio and leverage) have signs opposite to my expectations, whereas others (e.g.,
current year loss dummy, prior year opinion type, and institutional environment) show
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significant relationships with audit opinions. However, when I add the inverse Mills
ratio to the logit regression model, all of the coefficients are adjusted, with the
direction of some coefficients changed (e.g., current ratio and leverage). After
controlling for self-selection bias, the significance of some variables is also greatly
enhanced. Correlation matrix of independent variables including inverse Mils ratio
indicates that there is no multicollinearity problem. For instance, firms with a larger
amount of assets, less inventory, and better performance in the stock market are less
likely to receive modified audit opinions. In addition, the coefficient for the
institutional environment variable changes from 0.0965 at the 10% level of
significance to 0.3645 at the 1% level of significance, and the pseudo R-squared for
the overall model increases by nearly 5% and shows a relatively higher goodness of fit.
The significantly negative coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio captures the audit
opinion companies would have received if they had chosen non-Big 4 auditors.
Because Big 4 auditors are more independent and their clients are in better financial
condition, their clients would have received more clean opinions if they had chosen
firms in the alternative group of auditors.

[Insert Table 5 here]

The adjusted opinion prediction model suggests that Big 4 auditors consider client
size, profitability, and potential litigation risk as key factors when issuing audit
opinions. That is, Big 4 auditors tend to issue modified audit opinions if their clients
received a modified opinion in the previous year. It is interesting to note that the
coefficient of ROE is not significant at all, which suggests that Big 4 auditors do not
value firm book earning highly. Firms that issue B shares are less likely to receive
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qualified opinions, and firms with good performance in the stock market and with a
market performance superior to that of other firms in the same industry tend to receive
clean audit opinions. Finally, firms located in regions with a weak institutional
environment tend to receive modified audit opinions.
4.2. Audit Collusion Proxy Generation
In the process of audit collusion proxy generation, I apply the audit opinion
prediction model by Big 4 auditors to non-Big 4 auditees, and then get the predicted
audit opinions for each client of non-Big 4 auditors. I first apply the audit opinion
prediction model to Big 4 auditees themselves to check the self-prediction accuracy of
my model. Panel A of Table 6 indicates that the audit opinion prediction model for Big
4 auditees has about 98.26% self-prediction accuracy. According to my definition of
the audit collusion proxy, only 1 of the 394 firms audited by Big 4 auditors has a sign
for audit collusion, which accounts for approximately 0.25% of the total number of
firms that are audited by Big 4 auditors. It is worthwhile to mention that among the Big
4 auditees, the actual opinions of seven firms are modified whereas their predicted
opinions are clean. The predictive ability of my model might cause some
misclassification; however, another plausible explanation exists. I interpret these
seven audit cases as “conservative” cases, that is, the auditors involved in these cases
are more conservative on average than other Big 4 auditors when issuing audit
opinions.

[Insert Table 6 here]

Panel B of Table 6 shows that 190 firms that are audited by non-Big 4 auditors
have modified predicted audit opinions, but have clean opinions as their actual audit
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opinions. These firms account for 3.90% of the total number of non-Big 4 auditees in
my sample. The audit collusion proxy for these 190 firms is equal to 1, and the rest of
the firms that audited by non-Big 4 auditors show no evidence of audit collusion.
Similarly, 252 cases (5.17%) are conservative cases. Three possible explanations are
given. First, as I previously mentioned, some non-Big 4 auditors in China are as large
as Big 4 auditors in terms of market share, and these auditors have the same incentives
as Big 4 auditors to be independent; thus, they treat clients conservatively. Second, the
CSRC mandates that any listed firm with two successive years of losses or with an
asset value per share less than the face value will be specially treated (ST) on the stock
exchange, and a listed firm with losses for three successive years is classified as a
“particular transfer (PT)” firm, which can be delisted at the discretion of regulators.
ST/PT firms account for 6.32% of firms in the collusion group, and for 4.33% of firms
in the group that has a predicted opinion the same as the actual audit opinion (control
group). However, ST/PT firms account for 21.42% of firms in the conservative group.
These firms are subject to more regulations and litigation risk; therefore, it is rational
for auditors to be more conservative when issuing audit opinions to ST/PT firms. Third,
when the influence of the institutional environment is considered, the reason for
auditor conservatism is more obvious. The mean of the institutional factor ranking for
the collusive group is 15.684, for the control group 11.884, and for the conservative
group 10.7302, and the mean differences between these three groups are significant at
the 1% level. It can be seen from the results that audit collusion occurs in regions with
a relatively poor institutional environment, and that conservative treatment of clients
by auditors usually occurs in regions with a good institutional environment. The
results also support my hypothesis that a good institutional environment can deter
audit collusion.
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Moreover, only 35 out of 190 collusive audit cases switched their auditors during
the sample period. This finding reinforces my earlier point that auditor switching is not
an adequate indicator of audit collusion, and the prior literature about opinion
shopping cannot fully capture the collusive behavior between auditors and their
clients.
I find empirical evidence of the existence of audit collusion in China’s capital
market even without using auditor switching as an indicator 4 . Some factors may
influence the accuracy of the audit collusion proxy. First, employing the difference
between the actual audit opinion and predicted audit opinion to generate an audit
collusion proxy depends on the assumption that the accounting numbers that appear on
the financial reports reflect the true performance of listed companies. However, fake
transactions that are designed to boost earnings but are not detected by auditors cannot
be captured in my proxy generation process. Second, because Big 4 auditors do not
have a relatively high market share in China’s audit market, the sample size of Big 4
auditees is not very large. However, my model appears very reliable, because it
achieves high accuracy in self-prediction for Big 4 auditees.
4.3. Determinants of Audit Collusion
The logit regression results for audit collusion determinants are reported in Table
7 and Table 8. Consistent with my hypotheses, the coefficient for the SOE indicator is
0.5615, significant at the 5% level, which denotes a high relation between audit
collusion and SOE ownership. The interaction between the SOE indicator and its
financial performance proxy, pfmc, which is a rank transformation of all financial
variables of listed firms, is also positively related with audit collusion. This result
4
The Audit Quality Announcement No. 4 issued by National Audit Office of Peoples’ Republic of China on
September, 26th, 2005 disclosed nine audit firms that had issued questionable audit reports towards their clients. My
model successfully captures 6 of them. They are Vocation International (8 collusive cases), China Rightson
Certificated Public Accountants (2 collusive cases), Sichuan Junhe Certificated Public Accountants (5 collusive
cases), Shinewing Certificated Public Accountants (1 collusive cases), Hunan Carea Certificated Public
Accountants (13 collusive cases), and Zhonghongxin Jianyuan Certificated Public Accountants (5 collusive cases).
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shows that enterprises with the government as the ultimate shareholder and
demonstrating poor financial performance are more inclined to collude with their
auditors. However, the interactions that represent SOEs with superior financial
performance, and non-SOEs with either good or poor financial performance, have
negative relations with audit collusion 5 . These empirical results fully support
hypothesis one, which posits that state-owned firms take part in audit collusion,
especially when they have poor financial performance. SOEs in good financial
condition do not need to collude with their auditors, whereas non-SOEs do not take
part in audit collusion because they do not have to power to exert political pressure on
their auditors. The coefficient for the product of SOEs and share percentage of the
largest shareholder is significantly positive at the 5% level, and the coefficient for the
interaction of non-SOEs and share percentage of the largest shareholder is
significantly negative at the 5% level. These results suggest that share concentration in
the hands of the government induces audit collusion, whereas share concentration in
the hands of private individual investors aligns the interests of the largest shareholders
and those of other shareholders, hence deterring audit collusion. Therefore, hypothesis
two is supported.

[Insert Table 7 and Table 8 here]

Age, which denotes the average age of all senior managers, shows a negative
relation with audit collusion. This finding suggests that the more experienced the top
managers, the less likely they are to guide the firm to take part in audit collusion.

5

For Table 7, the interactions of SOE*Pfmc and SOE*(1-Pfmc) denote SOEs with inferior financial performance,
and SOEs with superior financial performance, respectively. While, for Table 8, (1-SOE)*Pfmc and
(1-SOE)*(1-Pfmc) denote non-SOEs with inferior financial performance, and non-SOEs with superior financial
performance, respectively.
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Auditor switching has a positive relation with audit collusion. However, neither of
these two variables shows significant effects on audit collusion, which supports my
assertions that audit collusion is not necessarily linked to auditor switching and that
methods that use only auditor switching as an indicator for audit collusion are flawed.
The regression results show that the greater the proportion of non-executive directors
to the total number of directors on the board of directors, the less likely is the listed
firm to take part in audit collusion. Again, although all the coefficients show a clear
negative connection between the independent ratio and audit collusion, the
relationship is not significant. Firms with a potential delisting risk show an
insignificantly negative relation with audit collusion. There are two possible
explanations: First, firms that have two consecutive losses in the previous two years,
and already drew attention by CSRC. These firms are under a more strict supervision
from regulators, and hence have fewer opportunities to collude with their auditors.
Second, auditors treat firms that probably will be delisted in current fiscal year more
conservatively in order to avoid litigation risks. Firms with superior overall
performance, say a larger amount of assets, a higher current ratio, lower leverage, and
with positive revenue, are not inclined to take part in audit collusion. It is worthwhile
to point out that ROE has a very significantly positive relationship with audit collusion.
I argue this result is based on the low quality of book earnings in China’s capital
market. In China, listed firms have to meet certain profit requirements in order to
continue to be listed or make seasonal offerings, and these regulations create a strong
incentive for listed firms to manipulate earnings. This finding also partially explains
why Big 4 auditors do not value book earnings highly when they issue audit opinions.
Moreover, higher litigation risk leads to audit collusion, as both receivables and
inventory have significantly positive relations with audit collusion. The literature
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indicates a high consistency between audit opinion in the current period and prior
periods, so firms that have received modified audit opinions in the past tend to collude
with their auditors in the current period to avoid receiving another modified audit
opinion. Evidence shows a strong positive connection between the receipt of a
modified opinion in the previous year and audit collusion in the current period.
Consistent with DeFond et al. (1999), I find that a long listing time results in audit
collusion, as older clients are more likely to run out of IPO funds and face financial
distress. Firms that issue B shares have a higher demand for quality auditors to verify
their financial reports in order to signal the market and assure their foreign owners of
their financial condition; therefore, these firms are less likely to take part in audit
collusion. Firms with better performance in the stock market also do not tend to be
involved in collusion. The coefficient of institutional environment, which is a rank
transformation of the three institutional sub-indexes, is significantly positively
correlated with audit collusion. This empirical result suggests that audit collusion is
more likely to happen in regions with a poor institutional environment than in regions
with a good institutional environment. Moreover, based on their institutional overall
rankings, I classify the first half of regions as the good institutional environment group
and the second half as the poor institutional environment group, and then I rerun the
regression for each group and compare the coefficients of SOE and its interaction
items between the two groups. No significant differences of the coefficients between
the good institutional environment group and poor institutional environment group are
found. Hence, there is a lack of evidence that SOEs are less likely to take part in audit
collusion in regions with a good institutional environment than in those with a poor
institutional environment. Hence, hypothesis three is only partially supported.
4.4. Limitations and Sensitivity Tests

- 44 -

I conduct some robustness checks of my main results. First, following Chan, Lin,
and Mo (2005), I employ a more precise definition of SOEs. I redefine an SOE as a
listed firm with the government as the ultimate owner, and the largest state-owned
share has to be at least 20%. The results remain the same and indicate that SOEs are
more likely to take part in audit collusion.
Second, the dummy variable Loss is used as an alternative indicator to denote a
firm’s financial situation. I use the interaction of SOE and loss to represent SOEs of
inferior financial status. One minus loss represents SOEs with superior financial status.
I get the same results. Third, instead of using rankings for institutional environment, I
use the sum of the government involvement index, capital market development index,
and legal enforcement index as the institutional characteristic for a specific
administrative region. I obtain the same results, which indicates that audit collusion is
more likely to occur in regions with a poor institutional environment.
This study has a number of limitations. First, I divide audit opinion into two
categories, clean and modified, and I capture audit collusion only from modified types
of opinion to clean opinion, but do not consider the severity of the opinions. For
example, I do not distinguish between a qualified audit opinion and a qualified audit
opinion with explanatory paragraphs, or between an adverse opinion and a disclaimer
of opinion. Second, when using the audit opinion prediction model, I assume that all
financial statement data are reliable and reflect the firms’ true performance. However,
some audit scandals indicate that firms will manipulate their financial figures to cover
their poor performance. To the extent that firms’ financial statements are not reliable,
my estimation model will be subject to error. Third, unlike the case in some Western
countries, in which Big 4 auditors have a very large market share, Big 4 auditors
occupy a relatively small share of the audit market in China. My results would be more
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convincing if the sample size of Big 4 auditees were larger.
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5.

Conclusion

This study examines the existence and determinants of audit collusion in a
transitional economy. I develop the research hypotheses based on the relation between
firm ownership, institutional environment, and audit collusion. I expect that audit
collusion exists with or without auditor switching. SOEs are more likely to take part in
audit collusion, especially when they are in poor financial condition. However, SOEs
with good financial performance, and non-SOEs with either good or poor financial
performance are not inclined to take part in audit collusion. I also expect that share
concentration will have varying influence on audit collusion. That is, state-owned
share concentration will lead to audit collusion, whereas non-state-owned share
concentration will deter audit collusion because it mitigates the free-rider problem of
monitoring small shareholders and aligns the interests of the largest shareholder with
those of other shareholders. Furthermore, I expect audit collusion to occur more often
in regions with a poor institutional environment.
Using data from China’s capital market and employing a two-stage logit
regression model with a two-step binary probit model to correct for self-selection bias,
I find empirical evidence for audit collusion, and all of my hypotheses are supported.
My results contribute to the audit collusion literature by providing for the first time
empirical evidence of the relationships among firm ownership, institutional
environment, and audit collusion. The implications of my findings for both researchers
and practitioners are threefold.
First, my measure of audit collusion is unique. I define audit collusion as the
discrepancy between the actual opinions that clients received from their auditors and
the opinions they would have received under similar circumstances from a “typical”
auditor. This method adds to the limited literature on audit collusion, and opens a new
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horizon for future empirical research on collusion.
Second, I introduce a two-step binary probit self-selection model into my audit
opinion prediction model. I also include institutional variables to capture the uneven
economic and legal development across China. This method contributes to the
development of audit opinion prediction and has very good classification ability,
especially in a transitional economy in which a great discrepancy exists in the audit
quality between Big 4 auditors and local auditors, and in which cross-sectional uneven
development of institutional factors exists.
Finally, my results have implications for policy makers in transitional economies
that are characterized by firms with highly concentrated government ownership and a
relatively poor institutional infrastructure. Audit collusion is detrimental for capital
market development, especially in emerging markets. To deter audit collusion,
governments should improve the overall institutional environment through measures
such as reduction of government ownership of firms, withdrawal of government
involvement in both the stock and audit markets, and development of the legal
environment.
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Appendix 1. Three Indices for Each Administrative Region
Government
Legal
Institutional
Involvement
Environment
Environment
Index
Index
Overall Ranking
ANHUI
5.24
7.43
5.32
9
BEIJING
3.85
6.40
7.97
8
CHONGQIONG
6.33
7.61
3.83
11
FUJIAN
3.74
7.12
6.32
13
GANSU
4.70
5.94
3.98
20
GUANGDONG
6.37
7.99
7.29
4
GUANGXI
3.46
7.89
4.92
16
GUIZHOU
4.89
5.43
4.36
19
HAINAN
5.25
6.02
6.33
12
HEBEI
7.20
7.13
5.15
6
HEILONGJIANG
1.89
3.60
5.34
28
HENAN
5.80
5.54
4.93
15
HUBEI
4.21
5.11
5.05
22
HUNAN
5.90
5.73
2.62
23
JIANGSU
7.67
8.12
6.29
3
JIANGXI
4.69
6.15
4.78
17
JILIN
5.37
5.70
5.81
14
LIAONING
6.16
6.14
5.53
10
NEIMENGGU
3.42
3.27
4.93
26
NINGXIA
4.36
3.79
5.16
24
QINGHAI
0.35
3.04
4.69
30
SHAN’XI
5.88
5.30
3.21
21
SHANDONG
7.74
7.38
5.63
5
SHANGHAI
7.94
7.49
6.98
1
SHANXI
1.08
4.54
5.53
27
SICHUAN
0.70
7.43
4.69
25
TIANJIN
5.34
6.05
6.96
7
XINJIANG
0.90
3.16
4.10
29
YUNNAN
4.75
6.56
3.87
18
ZHEJIANG
7.68
8.37
6.24
2
Indices for Tibet, where there is no company in the sample, are not provided.

Region

Credit Market
Index

Note: These three indices are based on the 2002 data from Fan and Wang (2003). The Credit
Market Index, Government Decentralization Index, and Legal Environment Index measure the
development of the local credit market, the degree of government involvement in the local
economy, and the development of the local legal environment for each province or province-level
region, respectively. Rank transformations according to these three indices are adopted in all
regressions in this paper.
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Table 1. Sample Description
Panel A: Number of Firms by Year, Firm Ownership, and Auditor Size

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total

SOE
Number
627
643
674
681
717
649
3991

%
84.6
81.1
77.1
74.0
73.2
67.6
75.8

Non-SOE
Number
%
114
15.4
150
18.9
200
22.9
239
26.0
263
26.8
311
32.4
1277
24.2

Big 4
Number
40
74
75
69
69
67
394

%
5.4
9.3
8.6
7.5
7.0
7.0
7.5

Non-Big 4
Number
%
701
94.6
719
90.7
799
91.4
851
92.5
911
93.0
893
93.0
4874
92.5

Total
741
793
874
920
980
960
5268

Panel B: Client Firm Ownership by Auditor Size and Year

SOE

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total

33
64
65
58
57
54
331

%
82.5
86.5
86.7
84.1
82.6
80.6
84.0

Big 4 Auditors
Non-SOE
%
7
17.5
10
13.5
10
13.3
11
15.9
12
17.4
13
19.4
63
16.0

Total

SOE

40
74
75
69
69
67
394

594
579
609
623
660
595
3660

Non-Big 4 Auditors
% Non-SOE %
84.7
107
15.3
80.5
140
19.5
76.2
190
23.8
73.2
228
26.8
72.4
251
27.6
66.6
298
33.4
75.1
1214
24.9

Total

701
719
799
851
911
893
4874

Panel C: Audit Opinion by Auditor Size and Year

Modified

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total

2
7
1
6
3
5
24

Big 4 Auditors
%
Clean
%
5.0
38
95.0
9.5
67
90.5
1.3
74
98.7
8.7
63
91.3
4.3
66
95.7
7.5
62
92.5
6.1
370
93.9

Total

Modified

40
74
75
69
69
67
394

79
80
55
81
100
76
471

Non-Big 4 Auditors
%
Clean
%
11.3
622
88.7
11.1
639
88.9
6.9
744
93.1
9.5
770
90.5
11.0
811
89.0
8.5
817
91.5
9.7
4403
90.3

Total

701
719
799
851
911
893
4874

Notes: SOE denotes a listed firm the ultimate owner of which is the government.
Big 4 denotes firms that are audited by Big 4 auditing firms in that fiscal year; Non-Big 4 denotes
firms that are audited by accounting firms that are not Big 4 auditing firms.
Modified opinions include an unqualified opinion with explanation, a qualified opinion, a
disclaimer of opinion, and an adverse opinion.
A clean opinion refers to a standard unqualified opinion.
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Table 2. Variable Definitions
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Financial Variables:
Assets
21.306
Current_Ratio
1.356
Leverage
0.233
ROE
-0.005
Loss
0.131
Receivables
0.086
Inventory
0.142
Capital Market Variables:
B_Share
0.067
Beta
1.045
Fluctuations
2.413
Firm_Avg＊
-0.017
Other Variables:
Big_4
0.075
Opinion
0.094
Prior_Opinion
0.092
SOE
0.758
Age
45.727
Time
6.744
Switch
0.113
In_Audit
0.375
Indp_Ratio
0.432
Delisting
0.031
No_1_Share
41.676
Pfmc
0.500
Institution
11.573

Std. Dev.

Min.

Median

Max.

0.956
0.850
0.368
0.360
0.337
0.069
0.108

17.412
0.020
0.000
-4.986
0
0.000
0.000

21.227
1.173
0.103
0.056
0
0.071
0.121

27.111
6.255
3.348
3.338
1
0.319
0.548

0.249
0.250
0.561
0.111

0
0.165
0.515
-0.399

0
1.071
2.352
-0.027

1
1.865
4.869
0.389

0.263
0.292
0.289
0.429
3.390
3.191
0.316
0.484
0.229
0.172
16.833
0.500
8.979

0
0
0
0
35
1.005
0
0
0
0
3.23
0
1

0
0
0
1
46
6.541
0
0
0.5
0
40.14
0.500
9

1
1
1
1
58
16.033
1
1
3
1
85
1
30

＊ Industry classification is based on the CSRC’s (China Securities Regulatory Commission’s)
industry classification as follows:

Mining industry;
Communication and literature industry;
Utilities industry;
Real estate industry;
Construction industry;
Transportation industry;
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing industry;
Wholesale and retail industry;
Social services industry;
Information technology industry; and
Manufacturing industry.
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Panel B: Variable Definitions
Variable
Definition
Financial Variables:
Assets
Natural log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year.
Current_Ratio
The ratio of current assets to current liabilities at the end of the fiscal year.
Leverage
The ratio of long-term debt to shareholders’ equity at the end of the fiscal
year.
ROE
The ratio of net income to shareholders’ equity at the end of the fiscal year.
Loss
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s net income in the current year is
negative, and 0 otherwise.
Receivables
The ratio of receivables to total assets at the end of the fiscal year.
Inventory
The ratio of inventory to total assets at the end of the fiscal year.
Capital Market Variables:
B_Share
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm issued B shares, and 0 otherwise.
Beta
Beta coefficient of the CAPM model.
Fluctuations
The standard deviation of daily stock prices during the fiscal year.
Common stock returns (including dividends) minus an equally weighted
Firm_Avg＊
industry return.
Other Variables:
Big_4
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor, and 0
otherwise.
Opinion
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm received a modified opinion for the
current fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.
Prior_Opinion
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm received a modified opinion for the
previous fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.
SOE
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is ultimately controlled by the
government, and 0 otherwise.
Age
Average age of all top level managers.
Time
Total listing time that a firm is listed in the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock
Exchange.
Switch
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm changes its auditor in the current fiscal
year, and 0 otherwise.
In_Audit
Variable equal to 1 if the company has an internal audit committee, and 0
otherwise.
Indp_Ratio
Ratio of independent board directors to the total number of board directors.
Delisting
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a two year consecutive losses in the
previous two fiscal years, and 0 otherwise.
No_1_Share
The percentage of shares owned by the firm’s largest shareholder.
Pfmc
The overall financial performance of the listed firm, equal to 1 if the listed
firm is in poor financial condition, and 0 otherwise.
Institution
Overall rankings of the local credit market, government interference, and
legal enforcement for each administrative region.
Imills
Inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman two-step logit regression.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics on Client Characteristics by Auditor Size
Firm Characteristics

Big 4

Non Big 4

P-Value

22.360
22.135
1.330
1.4302
1.1904
0.9448
0.2544
0.1044
0.3837
0.0517
0.0774
0.3038
0.0711
0
0.2573
0.0711
0.0483
0.0680
0.1304
0.1154
0.1096

21.221
21.173
0.865
1.3499
1.1722
0.8412
0.2311
0.1025
0.3671
-0.0097
0.0528
0.3642
0.1356
0
0.3424
0.0874
0.0731
0.0686
0.1432
0.1209
0.1080

0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0712*
0.1234
0.2276
0.0693*
0.0011***
0.0000***
0.0003***
0.0328**
0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0243**
0.0093***
-

Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.

0.2538
0
0.4357
1.0491
1.0707
0.2230
2.3435
2.2933
0.5223
0.0105
-0.0099
0.1201

0.0515
0
0.2210
1.0442
1.0712
0.2525
2.4187
2.3572
0.5638
-0.0193
-0.0289
0.1104

0.0000***
0.0000***
0.7114
0.8344
0.0105**
0.0107**
0.0000***
0.0000***
-

Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.

0.0609
0
0.2395
0.0406
0
0.1976
0.8401
1
0.3670
47.1675
47
3.3058

0.0966
0
0.2955
0.0958
0
0.2944
0.7509
1
0.4325
45.6110
46
3.3701

0.0194**
0.2375
0.0003***
0.0679*
0.0001***
0.0032***
0.0000***
0.0000***
-

Financial Variables:
Assets

Current_Ratio

Leverage

ROE

Loss

Receivables

Inventory

Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.

Capital Market Variables:
B_Share

Beta

Fluctuations

Firm_Avg
Other Variables:
Opinion

Prior_Opinion

SOE

Age
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Time

Switch

In_Audit

Indp_Ratio

Delisting

No_1_Share

Pfmc

Institution

Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.

7.2393
7.3868
3.3414
0.1117
0
0.3154
0.5152
1
0.5004
0.4386
0.5
0.2393
0.0152
0
0.1226
47.1966
47.8055
16.0042
0.3832
0
0.4868
6.6345
4
6.7469

6.7045
6.5164
3.1752
0.1126
0
0.3162
0.3636
0
0.4811
0.4315
0.5
0.2284
0.0318
0
0.1755
41.2292
39.3600
16.8207
0.5094
1
0.5000
11.9721
9
9.0191

0.0014***
0.0017***
0.9536
0.9746
0.0000***
0.0000***
0.5507
0.6910
0.0660*
0.0661*
0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0000***
-

Notes: The ANOVA F-statistics for equality of means and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of the
differences between medians are employed in Table 3. The p-values are reported.
All p-values are one tailed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
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Table 4. Heckman First-Step Probit Regression of Self-Selected Big 4 Auditors
(Dependent Variable: Big_4)
Predicted Sign
Explanatory Variables:

Coefficients

Z-Statistics

P-Value

Constant
In_Audit
Assets
Current_Ratio
Leverage
ROE
Loss
Receivables
Inventory
Prior_Opinion
B_Share
Beta
Fluctuations
Firm_Avg
Institution

-15.5546***
0.2721***
0.6225***
0.1514***
-0.2901***
-0.1610
-0.1117
-0.7006
-0.6416**
-0.2686**
0.7277***
0.0929
0.3062***
0.3752
-0.0279***

-17.6698
4.2678
16.7324
4.4308
-3.0556
-1.3247
-0.8386
-1.4857
-2.2949
-2.0055
8.5966
0.5616
3.2415
1.3171
-6.8189

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0022
0.1853
0.4017
0.1374
0.0217
0.0449
0.0000
0.5744
0.0012
0.1878
0.0000
0.2566
5268

?
+
+
+
+
+
+
?
+
-

Pseudo R-squared
Sample Size

Note: All p-values are one tailed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
The z-statistics are reported to test for differences in proportion.
The pseudo R-squared adopts the McFadden R-squared index to measure the goodness of fit of the
model.
The dependent variable and all explanatory variables are defined as in Table 2.
The year and industry specifics are controlled but not reported for convenience.
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Table 5. Heckman Second-Step Logit Regression of Opinion Prediction by Big 4
Auditors
(Dependent Variable: Opinion)
Predicted
Sign

Original

Adjusted by Imills

Coefficient

P-Value

Coefficient

P-Value

1.1934
-0.2395
0.4903
-1.7558
-3.1686
4.5465***
1.3053
3.7087
5.8615***
-0.0038
-1.7164
-1.3230
-6.4604
0.0965*

0.9172
0.6154
0.1616
0.3045
0.2884
0.0012
0.7711
0.2212
0.0000
0.9964
0.3662
0.2753
0.1278
0.0544

153.8574**
-6.0663**
-0.9394
0.6394
-2.3810
5.5913***
7.3084
12.5130**
8.7556***
-6.3280**
-1.9594
-3.9822**
-8.9253**
0.3645***
-11.7927**

0.0190
0.0166
0.1568
0.7551
0.4711
0.0012
0.1751
0.0108
0.0000
0.0199
0.3697
0.0351
0.0446
0.0057
0.0173
0.6810
394

Explanatory Variables:
Constant
Assets
Current_Ratio
Leverage
ROE
Loss
Receivables
Inventory
Prior_Opinion
B_Share
Beta
Fluctuations
Firm_Avg
Institution
Imills
Pseudo R

?
+
+
+
+
+
?
+
-

2

0.6388
394

Sample Size

Notes: All p-values are one tailed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
The pseudo R-squared adopts the McFadden R-squared index to measure the goodness of fit of the
model.
The explanatory variable Imills represents the inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman self-selection
model. The dependent variable and all other explanatory variables are defined as in Table 2.
The year and industry specifics are controlled but not reported for convenience.
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Table 6. Audit Collusion Proxy Generation
Panel A: Opinion Prediction Model for Big 4 Auditor Self-Prediction Results

Opinion Prediction Model for Big 4 Auditor Self-Prediction Results:
Predicted Opinion
Actual Opinion
Audit Collusion
Opinion

Number

Percentage

1

18

4.57%

0

376

95.43%

Opinion

Number

Percentage

Collusion

Number

Percentage

1
0
1
0

17
1
7
369

4.61%
0.25%
1.78%
93.65%

0
1
0
0

17
1
7
369

4.61%
0.25%
1.78%
93.65%

Panel B: Apply Opinion Prediction Model for Big 4 Auditors to Non-Big 4 Auditees

Apply Opinion Prediction Model for Big 4 Auditors to Non-Big 4 Auditees:
Predicted Opinion
Actual Opinion
Audit Collusion
Opinion

Number

Percentage

1

409

8.39%

0

4465

91.61%

Opinion

Number

Percentage

Collusion

Number

Percentage

1
0
1
0

219
190
252
4213

4.49%
3.90%
5.17%
86.44%

0
1
0
0

219
190
252
4213

4.49%
3.90%
5.17%
86.44%

Notes: The Opinion column represents a modified audit opinion when Opinion equals 1, and a
clean audit opinion when Opinion equals 0.
Collusion is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the predicted opinion is 1 but the actual opinion
is 0.
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Table 7. Logit Regression Results for Audit Collusion and SOEs
(Dependent Variable: Collusion)
Coefficient
(P-Value)
(Model 1)
Independent Variables:
Constant
90.3570***
(0.0000)
SOE
0.5615**
(0.0175)
SOE*Pfmc

Coefficient
(P-Value)
(Model 2)

Coefficient
(P-Value)
(Model 3)

Coefficient
(P-Value)
(Model 4)

89.8370***
(0.0000)

89.3681***
(0.0000)

90.4827***
(0.0000)

0.4852**
(0.0211)

SOE*(1-Pfmc)
SOE*No_1_Shar
e
Age
Switch
Indp_Ratio
Delisting
Assets
Current_Ratio
Leverage
ROE
Loss
Receivables
Inventory
Prior_Opinion
Time
B_share
Beta
Fluctuations
Firm_Avg

-0.0221
(0.9336)

-0.0246
(0.4297)
0.3736
(0.1349)
-0.1550
(0.7393)
-0.6894
(0.1543)
-3.7039***
(0.0000)
-0.5104***
(0.0020)
0.9657***
(0.0077)
0.9742***
(0.0000)
4.4527***
(0.0000)
5.9223***
(0.0000)
9.3465***
(0.0000)
3.6036***
(0.0000)
0.0684*
(0.0653)
-3.3059***
(0.0000)
-0.6430
(0.1655)
-2.1676***
(0.0000)
-3.7765***
(0.0000)

-0.0182
(0.5518)
0.3633
(0.1461)
-0.1454
(0.7542)
-0.6896
(0.1527)
-3.6850***
(0.0000)
-0.4576***
(0.0059)
0.8715**
(0.0187)
0.9831***
(0.0000)
4.3474***
(0.0000)
5.1517***
(0.0005)
9.0653***
(0.0000)
3.5912***
(0.0000)
0.0680*
(0.0679)
-3.3157***
(0.0000)
-0.5061
(0.2792)
-2.1758***
(0.0000)
-3.7517***
(0.0000)
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-0.0058
(0.8473)
0.3895
(0.1175)
-0.2206
(0.6358)
-0.7262
(0.1344)
-3.6736***
(0.0000)
-0.5180***
(0.0018)
1.0083***
(0.0057)
1.0086***
(0.0000)
4.4289***
(0.0000)
5.8793***
(0.0001)
9.3853***
(0.0000)
3.5613***
(0.0000)
0.0676*
(0.0679)
-3.2496***
(0.0000)
-0.6282
(0.1779)
-2.1498***
(0.0000)
-3.7884***
(0.0000)

0.0112**
(0.0110)
-0.0244
(0.4330)
0.3718
(0.1387)
-0.1684
(0.7191)
-0.7574
(0.1204)
-3.7131***
(0.0000)
-0.5156***
(0.0019)
1.0155***
(0.0049)
0.9825***
(0.0000)
4.4645***
(0.0000)
5.8128***
(0.0001)
9.3055***
(0.0000)
3.5883***
(0.0000)
0.0801**
(0.0335)
-3.2884***
(0.0000)
-0.6486
(0.1618)
-2.1645***
(0.0000)
-3.7704***
(0.0001)

Institution
Imills
2

Pseudo R
Sample Size

0.2488***
(0.0000)
-7.3007***
(0.0000)
0.4391
4874

0.2491***
(0.0000)
-7.2860***
(0.0000)
0.4388
4874

0.2493***
(0.0000)
-7.3081***
(0.0000)
0.4355
4874

0.2484***
(0.0000)
-7.2757***
(0.0000)
0.4395
4874

Notes: All p-values are one tailed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
The p-values are reported in parentheses.
The pseudo R-squared adopts the McFadden R-squared index to measure the goodness of fit of the
model.
The dependent variable and all other explanatory variables are defined as in Table 2.
The year and industry specifics are controlled but not reported for convenience.

- 63 -

Table 8. Logit Regression Results for Audit Collusion and Non-SOEs
(Dependent Variable: Collusion)
Coefficient
(P-Value)
(Model 1)
Independent Variables:
Constant
90.9185***
(0.0000)
1-SOE
-0.5615**
(0.0175)
(1-SOE)*Pfmc

Coefficient
(P-Value)
(Model 2)

Coefficient
(P-Value)
(Model 3)

Coefficient
(P-Value)
(Model 4)

89.3491***
(0.0000)

92.0677***
(0.0000)

90.2895***
(0.0000)

-0.2789
(0.2863)

(1-SOE)*(1-Pfmc)

-0.9844**
(0.0220)

(1-SOE)*No_1_Share
Age
Switch
Indp_Ratio
Delisting
Assets
Current_Ratio
Leverage
ROE
Loss
Receivables
Inventory
Prior_Opinion
Time
B_share
Beta
Fluctuations
Firm_Avg

-0.0246
(0.4297)
0.3736
(0.1349)
-0.1550
(0.7393)
-0.6894
(0.1543)
-3.7039***
(0.0000)
-0.5104***
(0.0020)
0.9657***
(0.0077)
0.9742***
(0.0000)
4.4527***
(0.0000)
5.9223***
(0.0000)
9.3465***
(0.0000)
3.6036***
(0.0000)
0.0684*
(0.0653)
-3.3059***
(0.0000)
-0.6430
(0.1655)
-2.1676***
(0.0000)
-3.7765***
(0.0000)

-0.0110
(0.7195)
0.3902
(0.1170)
-0.2034
(0.6624)
-0.7045
(0.1462)
-3.6639***
(0.0000)
-0.5294***
(0.0013)
1.0064***
(0.0052)
0.9846***
(0.0000)
4.4346***
(0.0000)
6.0171***
(0.0000)
9.4329***
(0.0000)
3.5685***
(0.0000)
0.0680*
(0.0664)
-3.2671***
(0.0000)
-0.6784
(0.1434)
-2.1400***
(0.0000)
-3.8240***
(0.0000)
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-0.0202
(0.5115)
0.3629
(0.1462)
-0.1786
(0.7021)
-0.7380
(0.1284)
-3.7590***
(0.0000)
-0.4763***
(0.0038)
0.9592***
(0.0085)
1.0329***
(0.0000)
4.4674***
(0.0000)
5.6090***
(0.0001)
9.2180***
(0.0000)
3.6140***
(0.0000)
0.0687*
(0.0722)
-3.2888***
(0.0000)
-0.5131
(0.2683)
-2.2134***
(0.0000)
-3.6673***
(0.0000)

-0.0140**
(0.0475)
-0.0184
(0.5500)
0.3785
(0.1297)
-0.1854
(0.6895)
-0.7215
(0.1365)
-3.6883***
(0.0000)
-0.5161***
(0.0017)
0.9806***
(0.0066)
0.9802***
(0.0000)
4.4402***
(0.0000)
5.9067***
(0.0000)
9.3575***
(0.0000)
3.5906***
(0.0000)
0.0648*
(0.0809)
-3.2872***
(0.0000)
-0.6657
(0.1504)
-2.1493***
(0.0000)
-3.7504***
(0.0000)

Institution
Imills
2

Pseudo R
Sample Size

0.2488***
(0.0000)
-7.3007***
(0.0000)
0.4391
4874

0.2491***
(0.0000)
-7.2758***
(0.0000)
0.4362
4874

0.2497***
(0.0000)
-7.4092***
(0.0000)
0.4392
4874

0.2493***
(0.0000)
-7.2934***
(0.0000)
0.4381
4874

Notes: All p-values are one tailed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
The p-values are reported in parentheses.
The pseudo R-squared adopts the McFadden R-squared index to measure the goodness of fit of the
model.
The dependent variable and all other explanatory variables are defined as in Table 2.
The year and industry specifics are controlled but not reported for convenience.
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